Time Running Out for Five Old Email Connection Protocols
I’ve heard some people doubting that Microsoft will remove basic authentication from five mailbox connection protocols on 13 October 2020. The argument advanced is that customers won’t allow this to happen because removing basic auth connections will be too disruptive.
Disruption will certainly happen if you’re running obsolete clients like Outlook 2010 which don’t support modern authentication. Or if you use POP3 and IMAP4 to connect to fetch messages and the developers of your email client don’t pick up the new OAuth-compliant versions of these protocols. The biggest issue here is likely to be with devices that use these protocols to connect to Exchange to fetch messages as I have no idea how the device manufacturers will approach the upgrade. Other issues exist with applications built with Exchange Web Services where programmers don’t quite know how to move forward (this blog by MVP Ingo Geganwarth might help). Or if you have an old mobile email client which likes to use basic auth with ActiveSync.
Finally, there’s PowerShell… We’ll have to switch to modules which support modern authentication, like the Exchange Online Management module, and upgrade scripts to make sure that authentication still works, especially for scheduled scripts which run without human intervention.
There’s work to be done. Lots of work, but the final goal of eliminating insecure authentication methods from Office 365 is worthwhile. Those who doubt this statement might consider a recent case study by the Microsoft Detection and Response Team (DART), the people who help companies when malicious actors have penetrated networks to create persistent threat.
A Case Study of a Compromised Office 365 Tenant
The case study explains that attackers obtained the password of the Office 365 administrator via a password spray attack. Multi-factor authentication (MFA) was not enabled on this account. Microsoft says that 99.9% of account compromise attacks are blocked with MFA. Attacks like password sprays, which rely on basic authentication, run into a stone wall when an account uses MFA, which is why MFA should be used by as many Office 365 accounts as possible.
Once the attackers penetrated the administrator account, all of Office 365 was theirs to exploit. They used content searches to find “interesting” information in mailboxes and extracted and moved the information out of the company in preparation for something like a business email compromise attack. Poor auditing of actions like content searches and non-owner access to mailboxes enabled the attack to succeed. Eventually DART cleaned things up and concluded that
- MFA should have been used to prevent the attack succeeding on the administrator account.
- Conditional Access Policies would have helped prevent unauthorized access.
- Auditing should be part of regular operations.
- The only safe option is disallowing legacy authentication altogether. Blocking basic authentication for email is a great step forward in removing legacy authentication.
Hard Data for Account Compromises
Further insight (if needed), comes from an interesting session given at the RSA Conference 2020 called Breaking Password Dependencies: Challenges in the Final Mile at Microsoft featuring Alex Weinert (Director of Identity Security at Microsoft) and Lee Walker (Principal Architect, Microsoft IT). During this session, Microsoft said that about 1.2 million of their cloud accounts were compromised in January 2020. This is only 0.5% of the total user base, but it still points to the level of attack. In effect, an Office 365 tenant with 10,000 accounts can expect to have 50 compromised accounts every month, unless they use MFA, conditional access policies, and block legacy authentication. Although MFA alone blocks 99.9% of the compromises, but only 11% of enterprise users used MFA in January 2020.
Password Spray and Replay Attacks
Microsoft revealed that 480K of the accounts were compromised by password spray accounts (Figure 1), and 99% of password spray accounts use basic authentication with IMAP4 and SMTP.
A similar number of accounts were compromised by password replay attacks. People often use the same password for personal and work accounts, so if a password becomes known to attackers because a service is compromised, they might try to reuse that password to attack other accounts belonging to the user. Again, legacy protocols play a big role here, especially the combination of IMAP4 and SMTP. The protocols due to be disabled for basic auth on October 13, 2020 are highlighted in Figure 2. Microsoft says that a 67% reduction in compromises happens for tenants who disable legacy authentication. You can’t eliminate the possibility of attack, but you can make the task of the attacker much harder.
The Need to Eliminate Legacy Email Client Protocols
Looking at the account compromise rate by protocol, you clearly see the need to remove basic authentication for email connection protocols (Figure 3). This graph underlines why Microsoft is driving for the October 13, 2020 date.
The session also includes a lot of interesting and useful information about Microsoft’s experience of blocking legacy authentication within their own infrastructure. If you’re involved in the plan to prepare your tenant for the changes coming in October, it’s worth listening to how Microsoft worked through dealing with applications that depended on basic auth during their rollout.
Time to Get Going
It’s possible that Microsoft will come under customer pressure to extend the cut-off date for basic authentication. I hope they resist. Hard evidence exists that eliminating basic authentication helps enormously to increase resistance against attack. Why would anyone want to remain vulnerable?
Update April 30: Microsoft has announced support for OAuth connections with IMAP4 and SMTP AUTH. POP3 coming soon,.
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